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1. TAX AVOIDANCE: AN INTRODUCTION
A. Tax Avoidance v. Tax Evasion
Tax avoidance has various definitions in legal rulings and academic
literature:a)

Justice Reddy' calls it the "art of dodging tax without breaking the law";

b)

Black's Law Dictionary states that tax avoidance is the "minimization of
one's tax liability by taking advantage of legally available tax planning
opportunities";

c)

The Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD), terms
"tax avoidance as an arrangement of a taxpayer's affairs that is intended to
reduce his liability and that although the arrangement could be strictly
legal is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to
follow";2

d)

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) views tax avoidance as "artificial
arrangements aimed at circumventing law";

e)

The Carter Commission Report (Canada, 1966) states that tax avoidance is
"every attempt by legal means to reduce tax liability which would
otherwise be incurred by taking advantage of some provision or lack of
provision in the law";

f)

The landmark Helvering v. Gregory4 judgment says "any one may arrange
his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."

The common theme amongst all the definitions of tax avoidance is that it is
a "grey area" of exploiting, albeit legally, the tax laws of countries to maximum
benefit. There is often a thin line between acceptable tax avoidance, also known
as tax planning and unacceptable tax avoidance.

2

McDowell v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1985) 154 ITR 148 (Supreme Court of India)
[hereinafter "McDowell"].
Glossary of Tax Terms, http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en-2649 34897
33933853_1_i_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html.
Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission), 1966, Canada.
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d. 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
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Tax evasion on the other hand is the "unlawful escaping of tax liabilities."'
A distinction has to be made between tax avoidance and tax evasion; there
is no thin line but a gulf between the two. The latter is clearly illegal; the former
is legal. Another way to look at it is that tax avoidance is a breach of social
contract whereas tax evasion is a crime.
B. Tax Avoidance Techniques - General Theory

There are four basic tax avoidance techniques practiced,' though numerous
variations and subtleties exist:
a)

Deferred payment of tax liability

b)

Re-characterization of an item or income or expense to tax at a lower or nil rate

c)

Permanent elimination of tax liability

d)

Shifting of income from a high-taxed to a low-taxed person

In practice these techniques are carried out using the following methods:
a)

Use of tax Treaties for related-party transactions (i.e., "Treaty Shopping")

b)

Use of international tax shelters through artificial intermediary companies
(i.e., "CFC")

c)

Excessive use of debt over equity (i.e., "Thin capitalization")

d)

Non-arm's length transactions (i.e., "Transfer Pricing manipulation")

e)

Transfer of residence

f)

Branch entities

g)

Use of Tax Havens

The bottom line is that all tax avoidance techniques take advantage of
inconsistencies and discontinuities in the tax systems through various tax
arbitrage techniques. We will look at how these techniques are used in more
detail while discussing their counter-measures in later sections of this paper.

6

Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income, UK, 1955 [hereinafter
"Radcliffe Commission"].
R. Rohatgi, Anti-Avoidance Measures, in BASIC INTERNATIONAL TAXATION VOLUME II: PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 141 (2000).
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1I. SOURCES OF

A

ANTI-AVOIDANCE MEASURES

Introduction

Given these tax avoidance techniques, it is illustrative to see how
governments around the world react to this problem.
a)

b)

Legislative solutions: Most governments seem to rely on anti-avoidance
statutes which are passed by their legislatures. Such legislations can be
broken down into two categories and their distinction is very important
as we will see in later sections of this paper:
1.

Specific anti-avoidance rules targeted at specific tax avoidance
measures [hereinafter "SAAR"]

2.

General anti-avoidance rules which are, as the name suggests a catchcall system for tax avoidance [hereinafter "GAAR"]

3.

Bilateral measures are also pursued through treaties or Double
Taxation Agreements [hereinafter "DTAAs"]
i.

This can be done via various clauses inserted in them. Examples
of this include the "Beneficial Ownership" and "Limitation on
Benefit" clauses one finds in many Treaties.

ii.

The treaties may have specific anti-treaty shopping rules

iii.

The use of the Articles pertaining to Exchange of Information
in Treaties are also used to counter tax avoidance

Judicial solutions: The Courts across the world have been instrumental in
evolving and developing various judicial doctrines to curb tax avoidance.

c)

Administrative solutions: To figure out tax avoidance has taken place and to
get information on such practice is paramount; administrative measures are a
useful tool for governments to both curb and detect tax avoidance practice.

B. Judicialanti-avoidancemeasures
The Courts may take either a literal, i.e., strict view or purposive view
towards statutory interpretation. Dozens of Courts the world over have played
an important role in developing SAAR and GAAR principles and laws. The two
guiding principles' in judicial anti-avoidance are:
7

Frederik Zimmer, Form and Substance in Tax Law (IFA Cahiers, Vol 87A, General
Report 2002); See also supra note 7; IFA Online, http://www.ifa.nl.
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b)

Substance over form rule (artificiality test)
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(i) The "Business Purpose" rule
The "business purpose rule" is simple; it says that a transaction must serve a
business purpose, i.e., commercial justification, other than tax avoidance. Mere tax
advantage cannot be the sole or main business purpose. In the landmark judgment
Gregory v. Helvering the U.S. Supreme Court held that a corporate reorganization
under the law solely for tax purposes did not qualify for tax benefits.
It should be mentioned that business purpose is seldom defined in the
statutes; Courts simply adopt a common-sense view. There are several dozen
U.K. rulings which have attempted to define "business purpose".
There are some interesting questions one can ask when it comes to business
purpose; should the business purpose always be financial? Is defence from a
takeover a justified business purpose? Another question is, is the motive distinct
from purpose; does the purpose refer to the ultimate objective or aim or does it
mean the subjective motive of the taxpayer? The answer to these questions is left

as a puzzle for the reader to solve; suffice to say one could refer to Inland Revenue
Commissionerv. Brebner9 and Mallelieu v. Drummond."o
(ii) "Substance v. Form"
The substance versus form principle is wider in scope than the business
purpose rule; the 1987 OECD report defines it as "the prevalence of economic or
social reality over the literal wording of legal provisions."
Substance versus form makes for fascinating debate; when does one stop
literally interpreting and start piercing the veil? There is no easy answer for this.
Whatever be the case, it would be wise for any legal student or practitioner to
understand the various faces of "substance v. form" as listed below:

a) Legal v. Economic Substance
This applies to situations where due to the legal form used for the
transaction a taxpayer has the real economic power over the taxable income
without the tax liability.

8
9

10

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1934).
Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Brebner, [1967] 2 A.C. 182 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Mallelieu v. Drummond, [1983] S.T.C. 665 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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A famous case in this regard is the Duke of Westminster case." In this case
the taxpayer executed tax-deductible deeds of covenants to pay selected
employees without affecting their non-deductible wage entitlements. Under
separate non-contractual agreements with the employees, it was assumed
that they would not expect to be paid their existing wages but be content
with payment under the covenant plus such additional amount as required
to increase their income to their current salary. The House of Lords held that
they must be regarded as covenanted payments and that they were entitled
to deduct them. In short, the Court accepted the legal form of covenanted
payments although they could be treated in substance as the economic
equivalent of wage.
Another important case regarding economic substance is Aiken Industries
v. Commissioner.12 The short summary of this case is as follows: Mechanical
Products Inc. (Aiken's predecessor) raised debt from an Ecuadorian corporation
and issued promissory notes; the Ecuadorian corporation then exchanged these
promissory notes for new promissory notes issued by Industrias, a Honduran
company. Aiken repaid the debt and interest to Industrias, which in turn
repaid its debt along with interest to the Ecuadorian corporation. Revenue
contended that the entire structure was devised solely to avoid tax since
interest payments to Industrias would not be eligible to tax withholding under
US-Honduras Treaty (DTAA). The Court agreed with Revenue and held that
Aiken, the successor of Mechanical Products, was liable for withholding taxes
on interest paid.
One more landmark case relating to economic substance is Northern Indiana

PublicService Company v. Commissioner [hereinafter"Northern IndianaPublic Service
Company"]," The short summary is as follows. Northern Indiana USA intended
to raise debt in Europe where interest rates are relatively lower; for this a
subsidiary was set up in Netherlands to borrow from European bond holders.
The terms and two notes were different and there was a small spread at the
Dutch subsidiary level. Revenue contended that Dutch subsidiary was set up
to avoid tax. The Court disagreedwith Revenue saying financing was not with
related parties and Dutch subsidiary had profit motive from the start.

"
12
13

Duke of Westminster v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [1936] 1 A.C. 19 (H.L.)
(U.K.).
Aiken Industries v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971) (U.K.).
Northern Indiana Public Service Co v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 341 (1991).
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Figure 1: NorthernIndiana Public Service Company case
A very recent case on this principle is that of Jade Tradingv. United States." This
case involved a tax shelter designed to produce large, artificial, i.e., noneconomic
losses for tax purposes. The tax shelter involved 4 steps:
Investment in Foreign Currency
Contribution to a Partnership
Partnership Investments
Termination of Partnership Interests
The overall scheme:
Investor first simultaneously purchased a European-style call option and
sold a European-style call option.
The investor next contributed the purchased and sold options to a
partnership.

14

Jade Trading LLC v. United States, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 2008-5045 dated Mar. 23, 2010.
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The investor eventually exited the partnership, received an asset with a
claimed high-basis and low-value and then sold that asset to generate a
tax-loss.
A tax loss was anticipated because, at the time of the facts giving rise to the
case, an investor's basis in a partnership was ordinarily not decreased by the
amount of a contingent liability contributed to or assessed by a partnership. The
IRS held that the Jade partnership should be disregarded and all transactions
engaged in by Jade should be treated as being engaged in directly by the purported
partners. Both the Court of Federal Claims and the United States Appeals for the
Federal Circuit upheld that the contribution of the spread transaction, via euro
call options, to Jade was a transaction that lacked economic substance and affirmed
the denial of Jade's petition (Emphasis Supplied).

b) Sham Transactions
In a sham transaction, they (the 'tax avoiders') give effect to a transaction,
which they do not carry out, or do not intend to carry out or is a cover up for
another transaction or relationship. A sham transaction essentially conceals the
true nature or reality of a transaction that exists in form only. In short, the legal
form is retained but the underlying substance is not genuine in law.
A landmark judgment regarding sham transactions is the Knetsch case.'5 In
this case, the taxpayer borrowed money at 3.5% to make a return of 2.5% from an
investment in annuity issued by insurance company. Investment income was
taxed at lower capital gains rate and the interest payments were fully deductible
for tax purposes. The US Supreme Court treated the transaction as a sham and
disallowed the interest paid on the loan. It was held that there was "nothing of
substance to be realized beyond a tax deduction."

c) Doctrine of the Label ("wrong characterization")
In this method, parties use incorrect labels to classify or characterize a
transaction or relationship for tax purposes.
A relevant case in this regard is the Ridge Securities case,16 where the Court
rejected a loan with interest at over 400% per annum as a loan transaction.

15
16

Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
Ridge Securities v. IRC, (1962) 44 T.C. 373 (Ch.D) (U.K.).
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7
In CouncilofIndia case,1
the Court rejected a purchase consideration described
as an annuity payable over 47 years.

In the Vestey case" the taxpayer had agreed to sell his shares at a
consideration payable over 125 yearly instalments and treated the entire price
as a capital receipt.

d) Step-transactiondoctrine
Certain countries (like USA, UK, Japan and Canada) regard a series of connected
transactions as a single transaction under the "substance v. form" principle.
In a "step transaction", the intermediate steps in a chain of preordained,
even if bona fide, transactions may be disregarded and several related transactions
may be treated as a single composite transaction. Alternatively, a single
transaction may be broken into distinct steps too to determine its tax acceptance.
It was observed in McDonald's casel9 that "purely formal distinctions cannot
obscure the substance of the transaction."
An important case law in step-transaction is the WT Ramsay case20 where
the taxpayer made a large capital gain on the sale of a farm. To offset this, he
entered into a series of separate share and loan transactions which generated
both a non-taxable gain and fully allowable loss. The multi-step transactions as
a whole were circular and self-cancelling. The taxpayer hence began and ended
in the same financial position and still claimed a tax loss. The House of Lords
disallowed the loss as fiscal nullity since the taxpayer had made no real financial
loss and thereby established the "Ramsay doctrine" (doctrine of fiscal nullity).
Another case related to step transaction is Gregory v. Helvering2' where the
taxpayer attempted to avoid dividend tax through a tax free corporate reorganization.
A much referred judgment related to step transaction is the famous Furniss

v. Dawson case.'

17
18
1'
20

'2
22

Council of India v. Scobie, 4 T.C. 618 (UK).
Vestey v. IRC, (1949) 40 T.C. 112 (Ch.D) (U.K.).
Mcdonald's Restaurant of Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7 h Cir. 1982).
W.T.Ramsay Limited v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1981) 54 T.C. 101 (H.L.) (U.K.)
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2nd 809 (2nd Cir. 1934).
Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson D.E.R., [1984] A.C. 474 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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Figure 2: Furniss v. Dawson case overview
The short summary of this case is that Dawson decided to sell shares to Wood
Bastow for £152,000. There was a deferral of capital gains by the following stepsIncorporation of Manx, a company
Contribution of shares worth 152,000 in return for shares of Manx (taxfree transaction)
Sale of shares by Manx to Wood Bastow for E152,000
The Court applied the Ramsey doctrine and imposed direct tax on sale &
disallowed capital gains deferral.
It is interesting to note that the Courts in England have shown proclivity
towards moving away from the Ramsey doctrine in subsequent decisions like

Cravenv. White,23 Macniven v. WestmorelandInvestments Ltd.,' BarclaysMercantileBusiness
FinanceLtd. v. Mawson,' InlandRevenue Commissionerv. Scottish ProvidentInstitution,6
etc. The interested reader may take this up for further research.

e) Piercingthe CorporateVeil
The piercing of the corporate veil is one of the most debated topics today in
corporate circles.

23
24

25
26

Craven v. White, (1988) 3 WLR 423 (H.L.) (U.K.).
MacNiven v. Westmoreland Investments, [2001] S.T.C. 237 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v. Mawson, [2005] S.T.C. 1 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Scottish Provident Institution, [2005] S.T.C. 15
(H.L.) (U.K.).
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The classic case for veil piercing is Salomon v. Salomon 27 where Salomon
converted the business to a limited liability corporation when it was doing well.
The business then floundered and went into liquidation. The question was *what
was the true intent behind the conversion of the business?' The House of Lords
ruled that the company had been validly formed and in the famous words of
Lord Macnaghten, "The company is at law a different person altogether from the
subscribers to the memorandum of association..." On this basis, the court upheld
the conversion of business as bona fide.
Another classic in common law veil piercing is Adam v. Cape Industries.28
Synopsis of the case is that Cape was a large MNC based in England and in the
asbestos industry. NAAC (Cape's North-American subsidiary) had damages
claimed by its employees in Texas due to asbestos-related illnesses. NAAC was
liquidated and activities continued by new entity called CPC. Fact is that CPC
was set up with financial support from Cape and operated in same premises
with same employees as NAAC. However CPC was controlled via a Luxembourg
agency of Cape called AMC (i.e. Cape 4 AMC 4 CPC). When fresh damages were

claimed by employees, Cape refused to appear before American Courts saying it
had no interests in America anymore and that AMC (its agency) came between
CPC and Cape. The Courts sided on the side of Cape Industries saying the corporate
veil cannot be lifted. However in coming to their decision, most importantly, the
Courts went into an analysis on the three possible grounds for piercing, i.e.,
fraud, agency and the single economic unit theory.
An interesting Indian case related to corporate veil piercing in Company
Law is the Wood Polymer case.29 In this case, the company asked for grant of sanction
of scheme of amalgamation under section 391(2) of the Companies Act, 1956. The
scheme of amalgamation involved:
a)

Amalgamation of the transferor-company (Bengal Hotels Pvt. Ltd., a private
limited company) with the transferee-company (Wood Polymer, a public
limited company) along with the dissolution of transferor-company
without winding up.

b)

According to the official liquidator's report, the transferor-company (Bengal
Hotels) was merely created to facilitate the transfer of "Avenue House"

27
28
29

Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Adams v. Cape Industries plc, [1990] Ch. 433 (C.A.) (U.K.).
In re: Wood Polymer Limited (1977), 109 ITR 177 (Guj.) (High Court of Gujarat).
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immovable property (belonging to the transferor-company's parent, DOC
Ltd.) to the transferee-company (Wood Polymer) so as to avoid the payment
of capital gains tax, which would otherwise have been payable under
section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
c)

In order to avoid this capital gains tax, the transferor-company was floated
and transferor-company availed of the benefit enacted in section 47 of the
Income Tax Act.

The Court looked at relevant sections of the Companies Act and held that
the Court is not merely a rubber stamp in scrutinizing a scheme of amalgamation.
The following questions were also examined in detail by the Court:
a)

What was the legislative intent in introducing the second proviso to section
394 of the Companies Act?

b)

What is the ambit, scope and outer periphery of the concept of 'public
interest' as envisaged in the second proviso?

c)

Is the disclosed purpose put forth by the companies who have moved the
Court for sanction of merger/amalgamation, relevant consideration for the
Court or could the Court probeand go behind the apparentpurposeand ascertainthe
real purpose and take into consideration that purpose, so as to reach a
conclusion that for such a purpose the Court would not permit its process
to be utilized if the purpose is shown to be one which is opposed to public
interest? (Emphasis Supplied)

d)

If, exceptfor the tax benefit, no other purposeformerger/amalgamationis disclosed or
on probing, tax avoidance appears to be the major and only purpose for the
scheme, could it not be said that the purpose is such that Court should not
sanction the scheme on the ground that it is opposed to public interest?
(Emphasis Supplied)

e)

Should the Court by its process facilitate avoidance of tax, even if it can be
said that avoidance is legal and cannot be styled as tax evasion?

The Gujarat High Court looked at various decisions of the Indian and English
Courts and came to a decision that the said scheme of amalgamation could not be
sanctioned. It held that:
The scheme of amalgamation must have some purpose or object to
achieve...the purpose and the only purpose appears to be to acquire
capital asset of DOC Ltd. through intermediary transferor71
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company...it can never be said that the affairs of the transferorcompany sought to be amalgamated, created for the sole purpose of
facilitating transfer of capital asset, through its medium, have not
been carried out in a manner prejudicial to public interest.. .the Court

will not lend its name its assistanceto defeat public interest,namely tax provision.
... It must be confessed that it is open to a party so as to arrange its
affairs so as to reduce tax liability.. but it must be within the power of the

partyto arrangeits affairs.If the partyseeks the assistanceofthe Courtto reduce
its tax liability the Court should be the last instrument to grant such assistance
orjudicialprocess to defeat a tax liability.. here the tax cannot be avoided
unless the Court lends its assistance, namely, by sanctioning the
scheme of amalgamation. In other words, the judicial process is used
or polluted to defeat the tax by forming an appropriate device or
subterfuge. Such a situation can never be said to be in the public
interest and on this ground the Court would not sanction the scheme
of amalgamation. (Emphasis Supplied)
The key question is "when can the corporate veil be lifted?" The answer
from judicial rulings seems to be: when the device of incorporation is used for an
illegal, improper or fraudulent purpose or when mandated by specific provisions
of law or contract.
Empirical data on corporate veil piercing is available, as far as we know,
only in the USA. A study by Thompson"o showed 1,583 veil piercing cases before
1985 with 40% cases resulting in veil piercing. This should again be rich fodder
for the aspiring legal researcher!
India's stand in corporate veil piercing has been that the Courts typically
will not pierce corporate veil in tax cases. However with some recent decisions it
feels like the tide is changing; for example, refer Ansaldo EnergiaSPA"1 case where
ASPL India was "pierced" and 4 contracts were treated as a composite contract.
The recent Vodafone32 case is discussed in more detail in a later section but there is
some apprehension as to whether it will represent a new frontier in corporate
veil piercing by Indian courts.
30

31

32

Robert B.Thompson, Piercingthe Corporate Veil, an Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036 (1991).
Ansaldo Energia SPA v. ITAT, Tax Case No. 1303 of 2007, Jan. 12, 2009 (Mad.) (High
Court of Madras).
Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2008) 175 Taxmann 399
(Bom.) (High Court of Bombay).
72

Anti-Avoidance Measures
(iii) Civil doctrines
Courts in many countries have tended to apply civil law doctrines to control
general tax abuse. The main civil law doctrines used are:

a) Abuse ofRight ("Abus de Droit")
Several jurisdictions apply the form and purpose rules of abuse of right doctrine
under Civil Law (Example: Austria, France etc). The abuse of right is the
manipulation of the intention or spirit of the law. Courts typically disregard
the legal form where transactions are solely undertaken to avoid tax.

b) Abuse ofLaw ("Fraus Legis ")
Many civil law countries apply the Roman law doctrine of fraus legis. A
good example is The Netherlands. Frauslegis resembles the business purpose
rule. Under this, the Court disregards any transaction entered for tax
avoidance purposes and substitutes it by a "normal" transaction.

c) Doctrineof Simulation
Certain civil law countries, like Belgium, apply this doctrine to ensure
'substance over form'. It arises when there is no real transaction or there is
a hidden real transaction or relationship. In such cases tax authorities can
disregard the simulated transaction and replace it with the real one. This
principle resembles the sham transaction or doctrine of wrong label.
Examples of simulation include sale and leaseback transactions where the
respective rights and obligations of the parties are not transferred in
substance.

C. LegislativeAnti-Avoidance Measures
(i) SAAR & GAAR
Two kinds of statutory anti-avoidance measures exist: GAAR and SAAR.
The GAAR as its name implies is a set of general anti-avoidance rules; think of it
as a "catch-all" for tax avoidance. The SAAR is a specific anti-avoidance rule and
is targeted at curbing a specific avoidance practice or technique.

a. What is the rationalebehind GAAR?
It is easy to understand the need for SAARs and their source of evolution typically by judicial rulings or as a reaction to a commonly used avoidance
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technique in the marketplace. However what is the rationale for having GAAR
provisions? Justice Murphy said it best in FederalCommissionerof Taxation v. Hancock,
"The resource of ingenious minds to avoid revenue laws has always proved
inexhaustible and for that reason it is neither possible nor safe to say in advance
what must be found...." "
The advantages of GAAR are that given tax avoidance schemes are becoming
increasingly complex and tough to anticipate via SAARs, governments across
the world want to stop losing what they perceive as billions of dollars of revenue
and so implement GAAR provisions as a 'catch-all' scheme for tax avoidance in
general.
On the downside, the real problem with GAAR is that it can end up
promoting uncertainty.It is a good time to recollect what Adam Smith said about
taxes - that certainty is valued more than fairness and simplicity. The GAAR
may also be construed as contrary to the rule of law principle, i.e., laws are meant
to be reasonably certain or predictable.
In fact, the Canadian GAAR when introduced was challenged as
unconstitutional on these grounds but the Canadian Supreme Court held that
broad, purposive interpretation of GAAR is appropriate; refer Canada Trustco

Mortgage case.
A GAAR is basically an attempt to strike down avoidance that is not
understood at the time of drafting. The difficulty with having such a broad
scheme has been heavily debated in various countries as and when they grappled
with the thought of introducing GAAR. For example the Taxation Review
Committee, 1975, Australia debated:
In framing legislation sufficiently all-embracing to deter tax
avoidance, there is always the danger of penalizing those who have
a genuine reason for entering into a bona fide transaction, which, if
carried out by others, has the objective that ought to be prevented.
There is frequently such a very fine line to be drawn between the
transaction which offends and the one which merits no
condemnation.

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Hancock, (1961) 8 ATR 328, 333.
Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v. Canada, 2005 2 S.C.R. 601 (Supreme Court of
Canada).
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It must be noted that developed countries like USA, UK do not have statutory
GAAR. Rather, judicial doctrines combined with SAARs (prospective &

retrospective) and other administrative measures seem to be the right mix for
them.
A really interesting question (yet another prime material for the legal minds)
is whether GAAR really does slow tax avoidance; in fact, can there be an opposite
effect? Waincymer's research lead to his commentary on how when Barwick
High Court (Australia) strictly interpreted GAAR, it lead to an increase in the
level of tax avoidance in Australia! He states:
One intuitive lesson to learn from the Australian experience is that
when tax avoidance became virtually sanctioned by the High Court
in the 1970's, supermarket style off-the-shelf tax avoidance packages
reached epidemic proportions. Having the Chief Justice of the High
Court propound taxpayer rights would surely be a powerful
rationalizing factor for taxpayers and advisers.
In a similar vein, noted Canadian tax expert Arnold considers the Canadian
experience to demonstrate GAAR will only slow avoidance when interpreted
purposively and when narrowly interpreted it may actually lead to more tax
avoidance. He points out that when the Canadian Supreme Court in one of its
rulings endorsed a purposive approach of the provisions, Revenue Canada
responded by interpreting provisions literally. Further Revenue Canada
announced it would issue advanced tax rulings and issued a Declaration of
Taxpayer Rights which provided that taxpayers "have a right to arrange affairs
in order to pay the minimum tax required by law." According to Arnold, response
of taxpayers and their advisers to the approach of Revenue Canada was to engage
in aggressive tax planning which ultimately lead to shortfalls in collections of
taxes.
(b) SAAR
There are many examples of SAARs around the world enacted by various
countries. Some examples are thin capitalization rules and CFC (controlled foreign
corporation) rules which are passed to curb specific tax avoidance techniques;
suffice to say these are elaborated upon in the later section on tax avoidance and
counter measures.
Typically SAARs are prospective; however they can retrospective too and
the increasing use of retrospective SAARs is a cause of concern for taxpayers.
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(c) Treaty anti-avoidanceprovisions
Tax treaties (DTAAs) have evolved over time to include a plethora of antiavoidance provisions in them. Some of the examples are:
Arm's-length definition for related party transactions (Article 9) to defeat
transfer pricing manipulation,
Limitation on Benefit (LOB) clauses to counter treaty shopping,
The concept of "beneficial ownership" applied to Interests, Dividends &
Royalties (Article 10, 11 and 12) and
Specific provisions against transactions with tax havens.
All the above measures are dealt with in later sections of this paper when
tax avoidance techniques and counter measures are elaborately discussed. Hence,
we do not wish to duplicate the same content here but wish to point out that tax
treaties are evolving documents and are good weapons in the hands of both
Governments (in case of bilateral treaties) to sit down and come up with ways
and means to curb tax avoidance. It must be noted that the continuing
contribution by academic and legal experts at OECD (and the UN), whose Model
Conventions'- most countries follow is critical in this regard.
One anti-avoidance measure which we need to mention and which is not
discussed elsewhere in this paper is the Exchange of Information Articles in the
treaties. Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention is a widely accepted legal basis
for bilateral exchange of information for tax purposes. It creates an obligation to
exchange information that is foreseeably relevant to correct application of a tax
convention as well as for the purposes of administration and enforcement of
domestic laws of the Contracting States. This Article serves as an important tool
to detect and gather information on tax avoidance.
A related development is that of Taxation Information Exchange Agreements.
The OECD has developed a process that enables certain non-OECD offshore
financial centre jurisdictions to commit to eliminating harmful international tax
avoidance and evasion practices. These jurisdictions can do this by committing
to a program of exchange of information agreements with OECD member countries.

3

OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, January 2003; Canada
Trustco Mortgage Co v. Canada, 2005 2 S.C.R. 601 (Supreme Court of Canada).

76

Anti-Avoidance Measures
The OECD member countries and committed jurisdictions are collectively known
as 'participating partners'. There are a number of non-OECD offshore financial
centre jurisdictions committed to such taxation information exchange agreements
(TIEA). These agreements aim to establish effective information exchange and
improve transparency of taxpayers' financial arrangements/transactions for tax
purposes and also provide important momentum to achieve the aims of the OECD's
harmful tax practices initiative.

D. Administrativeanti-avoidancemeasures
Administrative measures are mainly to ensure compliance and/or to detect
tax avoidance. They are usually carried out in the following ways:
a)

By use of investigative powers when a GAAR exists

b)

By use of administrative powers to build a common law avoidance case, in
jurisdictions where no GAAR exists (example: New South Wales, Australia)

c)

By use of taxpayer alerts & rulings - these typically discuss how an
administration intends to apply statutory GAAR

d)

By appointing GAAR panels to decide GAAR issues.

Exchange controls & tax clearances are also used by countries as antiavoidance measures; these transactions are subject to either prior government
approvals or to post-transaction reporting of income or capital flows. For example,
Canada requires its residents to report all foreign investments in excess of 100,000
Canadian dollars to tax authorities. Many countries, especially developing, still
have partial or full exchange controls on current and/or capital account that
monitor tax issues on cross-border transactions.

III. ANTI-AVOIDANCE

-

A

WORLD WIDE SURVEY

It is illuminating to see the anti-avoidance measures used in various
countries around the world. 6 It seems that a combination of the various
techniques discussed in previous sections, have been used to combat tax avoidance.
One feels it would make an interesting study as to possible reasons for each
country to choose to evolve a particular set of anti-avoidance measures.

36

Supra note 7, at 153.
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Country

Short summary of anti-avoidance measures

Australia

*

2010

GAAR since 1981 Income Tax Act.

* Courts have shifted over the years to purposive interpretation
from a literal approach.
Austria

*

Taxpayer is free to arrange affairs but broad limitations are
placed under the GAAR.

* However, tax avoidance must be main or only motive of taxpayer
arrangements and strict burden of proof on tax authorities; it is
considered irrelevant that arrangements are "unusual".
Belgium

*

Traditionally applied civil law of simulation (also known as
Brepols doctrine).

* Normally adopts strict, literal interpretation, i.e., legal form
over substance is usually considered.
* GAAR was adopted in 1993, advanced rulings can be
obtained for GAAR.
Denmark

*

Applies substance over form under a "correct recipient of
income" principle.

Canada

*

In Stubart (1984), the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
business purpose test and reaffirmed the Duke of Westminster
doctrine.

* Enacted a GAAR in 1988; specific criteria for applying GAAR
set out by the Courts and benefit of doubt given to taxpayer.
France

*

Tax avoidance (evasionfiscale) lies between tax evasion (fraude
fiscale) and tax planning (habiletefiscale).

* Abuse of rights (abus de droit) doctrine based on decisions of
Conseil d'Etat and Cour de Cassation.
* Two tests of tax avoidance laid down:
*

Sole purpose to avoid tax (fraudea la loi) or

*

transaction is fictitious (simulation)

* Also apply doctrine of "abnormal management act" (acte

normal degestion).
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* Generally Courts favour the taxpayer; it is not unlawful to
choose the most economical, legal and financial way from a
tax viewpoint.
Germany

*

Contains GAAR in tax code (AO). Legal structures can be
disregarded under "abuse of form and legal structures"
provision.

* Courts apply substance over form; use the principle of
analogy and teleological reduction in their decisions. Advance
rulings are given.
* Germany has one of the highest numbers of anti-avoidance
related cases.
India

*

No GAAR yet. Domestic law has SAAR provisions (e.g.,
sections 37(1) and 40A(2), Income Tax Act, 1961).

* Underlying principles implemented through judicial and
administrative decisions.
* Courts have favoured taxpayer historically and taken literal
view. (Ref: KulandaganChettiar,R.M.Muthaiah and S.R.M Firm
cases).
* Azadi Bachao Andolan was a landmark case which accepted
that every man was entitled to arrange his own affairs as not
to attract taxes (reaffirming Duke of Westminster principle and
distinguishing McDowell).
Israel

*

Specific measures to counteract tax planning involving foreign
professional companies (FPC),

* Has a GAAR (section 86, Income Tax Ordinance).
Italy

*

Follows letter of law where form takes precedence over
substance.

* Tax avoidance so far handled through statutory provisions
(SAARs).
* Earlier efforts to introduce GAAR were unsuccessful.
Japan

*

Has authority to re-compute tax base of corporate income
tax, amount of net loss and corporate tax payable.
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Netherlands

*

Dutch Law provides for a GAAR though Courts rely onfraus
legis (abuse of law).

Portugal

*

GAAR introduced in 1999.

* Burden of proof remains with tax authorities to show
primary intention of tax avoidance.
Spain

*

Tax code allows taxation of transactions based on their real
economic nature, irrespective of legal form.

* Civil Code has also codified the abuse of law principle - two
special provisions namelyfraus legis and simulation.
Sweden

*

Attempted several versions of GAAR. The Tax Avoidance Act,
1995 was amended in 1998.

* Burden of proof lies with tax authorities and advance rulings
are given.
* Furthermore, law specifies that the GAAR can only be applied
under a Court order by tax authorities.
Switzerland

*

Applies both business purpose and substance over form
doctrine under its law.

* In tax avoidance cases the tax authorities can substitute the
customary construction for the transaction and tax
accordingly.
United
Kingdom

*

Does not have statutory GAAR.

* Do not accept principle of abuse of rights as applied in civil
law jurisdictions (Ref: Chapman v. Honig).
* In principle, tax avoidance is legal and tax evasion illegal;
transaction must not be unlawful and purpose/motive must
not be affected by specific anti-avoidance provisions.
* U.K. Courts traditionally follow literal approach rather than
purposive.
* Early U.K. decisions favour taxpayer (Ref: Duke ofWestminister,

Ayrshire PullmanMotor Service, etc.).
8o
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* U.K. Courts have also taken a purposive approach in several
legal decisions: Ramsay case, Furnissv. Dawson, McGuckian case.
* U.K. Courts still maintain that role of Courts to legislate and
look-through only in blatantly artificial transactions (Ref:
Craven v. White (1988)).
* Government primarily relies on SAAR and judicial decisions.
No GAAR was enacted though in 1988 the Revenue published
a consultative document but it was decided subsequently
not to implement any GAAR.
United States * Does not have statutory GAAR.
* The Courts have evolved several judicial anti-avoidance
doctrines.
* Gregory v. Helvering (1935) held that any one may arrange their
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible.
* Courts tend to apply substance over form (Ref: Aiken Industries
and Johanssonv. USA).
* Similarly, transactions or series of transactions without a
business purpose may be ignored.

IV. TAX
A

AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES & COUNTER MEASURES

Tax Avoidance Technique #1-TreatyShopping

The "abuse of tax treaties" is the use of tax treaties by persons the treaties
were not designed to benefit, in order to derive benefits that the treaty were not
designed to give. Treaty shopping connotes a premeditated effort to take advantage
of the international tax treaty network and a careful selection of the most
favourable tax treaty for a specific purpose (refer to Rosenbloom H.D, Tax Treaty
Abuse: Problems & Issues).
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(i) Treaty Shopping structures
There are a variety of treaty shopping structures. Some of them are:
a) Direct Conduits
A direct conduit works as shown in the diagram below. Resident of State R
expects to derive dividends, interest or royalties sourced in another state (State
S). So it sets up entity in a third state (State C) that will receive dividends, interest
and royalties in a more tax beneficial way than if income were paid directly from
State S to R. The tax advantage results from fact that tax treaty between S and C
provides for more advantageous withholding tax rate in State S if paid to State C
resident than if paid to State R resident.

SaR
Divdedsfinefstfoyahes
State C

(ConduiQ
Divcercsinterestrcyales
State S

Figure 3: Directconduit structure

b)Stepping stone conduit
A stepping stone conduit works as follows: Residents of State R establish
company resident in State C where it is fully subject to tax on income derived
from S. However it pays high interest, royalties, service fees, commissions &
82
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other expenses to a second related foreign company (base company) set up in a
fourth state (State B) and controlled by shareholders of the conduit company.
These payments are deductible in State C and are either not taxed or very
advantageously taxed in State B because the company enjoys a preferential tax
regime there.

Figure 4: Stepping Stone conduit structure

c)

Other structures

There are other treaty shopping techniques in practice; examples are
triangular structures where a low or nil taxed branch of a company in a treaty
country receives income from a third country. Another approach is to use hybrid
entities that are characterized differently in the two Contracting States.
Individuals can also treaty shop by transferring tax residence to another treaty
country, i.e., 'emigration' - also a form of treaty shopping. For instance, a resident
of France owning an important shareholding in French company may emigrate
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to Belgium in view of later sale of shares because under Article 18 of BelgiumFrance tax treaty the right to tax the capital gain is conferred to Belgium but
Belgium does not levy capital gains tax on individuals (except speculation).
In fact, the national policies of many countries favour treaty shopping. Source
countries may encourage (or at least, not discourage) it. Residence countries may
permit to develop overseas markets or improve competitiveness and/or limit
source taxation. For example, treaty shopping is encouraged in EU if it helps to
break national boundaries and create a single market. Also, generally developing
countries may view treaty shopping as a tax incentive.
In other words treaty shopping, when it is beneficial may be tacitly approved
and when disadvantageous may be disapproved. For example, some of them
have revoked tax treaties in cases of circular situations when the income is sourced
in the same country where the shareholder is resident but the income passes
through a company resident in another country for tax reasons, i.e., "round
tripping". This has been considered abusive by India, Brazil, Indonesia, etc.
(ii) Approaches against Treaty Shopping 7
a)

Neutral measures by combining domestic and tax treaty provisions.
Example: non-domiciled residents in U.K. may be entitled to treaty benefits
on foreign income only when remitted.

b)

Specific measures that deny benefits to entities which are not subject to tax
in their state of residence.

c)

Purpose-based measures that deny certain treaty benefits set up only for
claiming such benefits. Example is no tax refunds are given under
Netherlands treaty with the U.K. in such cases.

d)

Comprehensive measures imposed under domestic legislation or treaties.
For example, Article 22, U.S. Model Treaty on Limitation on Benefits, 1996;
Swiss Abuse Doctrine, 1962.

(iii)

Treaty Shopping and the OECD Model's "Beneficial Ownership"

The OECD Model Convention" has long recognized the problems caused by
treaty shopping. The OECD Model Convention has the concept of "beneficial

3
3

Supra note 7, at 167-182.
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, January 2003.
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owner" applied to Article 10 (dividends), Article 11 (interest) and Article 12
(royalties). Beneficial ownership is not just legal but also economic. There have
been various OECD reports over time which have constantly refined the approach
to combat Treaty Shopping OECD Report on Use of Conduit Companies (1987)
Harmful Tax Competition (1988)
Commentary Update 2003
(iv)

Treaty Shopping & Limitation on Benefit (LOB) clauses

Generally these LOB clauses exclude resident companies from tax treaty
benefits unless they have a sufficiently strong nexus to the contracting state
where they claim residence.
Such provisions may limit benefits to companies which have a:
Certain minimum level of local ownership (look-through approach)
Deny benefits to companies which benefit from a privileged tax regime

(exclusion approach)
Deny benefits to companies which are not subject to tax in respect of income
in question (subject-to-tax approach)
Deny benefits to companies which pay on more than a certain proportion
of the income in tax deductible form (channel approach)
(v)

Treaty Shopping & India

In the Azadi Bachao Andolan case,39 the Supreme Court held that there was no
inherent anti-abuse rule in Indian tax treaties and hence it required specific LOB
clause in the treaty itself for the denial of treaty rights. Treaty shopping is not
illegal:
Overall, countries need to take, and do take, a holistic view. The
developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage capital
and technology inflows, which developed countries are keen to
provide to them. The loss of tax revenues could be insignificant
compared to the other non-tax benefits to their economy. Many of
them do not appear to be too concerned unless the revenue losses
3

Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 263 ITR 706 (Supreme Court of
India).
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are significant compared to the other tax and non-tax benefits from
the treaty, or the treaty shopping leads to other tax abuses. Whether
it should continue, and if so, for how long, is a matter which is best
left to the discretion of the executive as it is dependent upon several
economic and political considerations.
B.

Tax Avoidance Technique #2 - Controlled Foreign Corporation0

Foreign-sourced income is taxed after it is accrued as income in the country
of residence of the recipient; thus it becomes possible to defer (or avoid) tax on
foreign dividend income until it is repatriated (for example, by not declaring
dividends or receiving them in an entity located in a "tax haven"). Several
countries prevent their residents from accumulating funds abroad through
exchange control restrictions. As countries increasingly ease their exchange
control rules many of them have enacted Controlled Foreign Corporation
[hereinafter "CFC"] rules to ensure there is no deferral of taxes on the foreign
income.
Under the CFC rules, the domestic law effectively extends the residence tax
rules to the income. It requires that the tax due on foreign profits, whether
distributed or not, be paid currently at home by tax residents.
CFC rules are normally applied in cases where the resident shareholders,
individually or collectively, have substantial influence or control over a foreign
corporation. Note that the said control could be equity or voting or ability to
share profit or assets on liquidation or nominative (de facto) control. The level of
control requirement (i.e., the "control test") by resident shareholders to qualify
as a CFC varies widely.

For example:41
a)

More than 50% equity or voting rights (i.e., control)
All resident shareholders: Germany, Israel, Japan, Portugal, South
Africa, U.K.
Five or fewer resident shareholders: Canada, United States
Single resident shareholder: Brazil, Denmark, Italy, Lithuania

40
41

Supra note 7, at 184-189.
Supra note 7, at 184-189.
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b)

At least 50% (i.e., substantial influence)
All resident shareholders - Finland, Norway, Sweden, Turkey
Five or fewer resident shareholders - Australia, New Zealand
Single resident shareholder - France, Israel, Korea, Spain

c)

Less than 50% but one resident shareholder has significant influence
Single resident shareholder - 40% or more share ownership in
Australia and New Zealand; 25% or more equity in Denmark,
Portugal and Sweden; and at least 5% equity with minimum
investment of 50% equity control through a corporate group in France.

d)

Countries which do not have any CFC legislation
India, Austria, Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland.

An important question must be answered: what transactions are taxable
under these CFC rules? Not all transactions are subject to CFC rules, they only
apply to the attributable income of the controlled foreign corporation. Countries
take different approaches for arriving at the attributable income:
i)

Locational/designated jurisdictional approach
Countries may be defined under a "white list" or "black list".
Several countries compare the effective foreign tax rate with their own
effective rate, as computed on similar income under tax principles. CFC
rules then apply to countries that have an effective rate equal or below
minimum specified rate.

ii)

Transactional approach
Targets "tainted" income; usually passive income and specific active income.
Such tainted income is attributed to domestic shareholders, subject to
exemptions (Examples: United States, Canada).

C.

Tax Avoidance Technique #3 - Thin Capitalization

Debt financing of cross-border transactions is often (not always) favourable
than equity financing for taxpayer.? In certain cases, dividend receipts may be
42

Supra note 7, at 214-237.
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preferable to interest income; for example if the dividends are tax exempted and
interest received is subject to a relatively high tax rate in the state of residence.
Thin Capitalization refers to excessive use of debt over equity capital; this can be
via hidden equity capitalization through excessive loans (or) the artificial use of
interest-bearing debt instead of equity by shareholders with the sole or primary
motive to benefit from tax advantages.
Some countries have thin capitalization rules which are primarily concerned
with loan capital provided by non-resident lenders, who are also substantial
shareholders of a domestic company. As expected, these rules vary widely in
counties that do apply the thin capitalization rules.
At the basis of thin capitalization is the use of debt instead of equity; normally
such use of debt instead of equity has several tax and non-tax advantages. For
example:
Interest expense is tax-deductible whereas dividend payments are not
Unlike interest, dividends are usually subject to economic double taxation
Debt financing avoids wealth taxes, net worth taxes and other capital duties
imposed on equity contributions
Debt allows the repatriation of capital invested as loan repayment without
tax consequences
It is possible to select currency of debt to minimize foreign exchange risks;
equity is normally denominated in the currency of the host country
Debt provides greater flexibility since it is possible to convert debt to equity
but not the reverse
Withholding tax on interest is often nil or lower than on dividends.
Approaches to thin capitalization taken by countries worldwide can be
categorized as follows: 43
i)

4

Arms-Length approach: Based on general principle of thin capitalisation;
would an unrelated party provide debt funds on same basis as related
party loan arrangement?
Supra note 7, at 214-237.
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ii)

Hidden Profit distribution: Specific provisions under tax law allow loan
interest to be reclassified as "constructive dividend"; these apply usually
when lender and borrow are related persons or have defined relationship.
It may also apply if subsidiary company is undercapitalized and a loan
from parent is of a permanent nature or on non arm's-length basis.

iii)

"No rules" approach: No specific rules; use GAAR and judicial doctrines

iv)

Fixed Ratio approach: Specify maximum debt-equity ratio in the rules

It must be noted that rules under domestic law on international thin
capitalization may be limited or overridden by double tax treaties. Also, many
countries, as yet, do not have any thin capitalization rules; examples are India,
Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, Israel, Indonesia, Brazil, Singapore, etc.
D.

Tax Avoidance Technique #4 - TransferPricingManipulation

Transfer pricing is an economic term which refers to valuation process for
transactions between related entities. The real issue is the sharing of taxable
income by countries in which the MNEs operate lawfully.
Transfer pricing affects situations when goods and services are provided,
knowingly or otherwise, on a non arm's-length basis by related entities.
Let us consider an example where transfer pricing manipulation can occur:
suppose a corporation manufactures products in country A and sells the finished
products in country B (via its subsidiary S) to unrelated parties (say, the public at
large). In such a case S's taxable profit is determined by three factors:
a)

price at which it resells products to the unrelated parties

b)

price at which the products were obtained from its parent corporation

c)

its expenses other than cost of goods sold.

Now if country A, where the products are manufactured, has a tax rate
much lower than B's tax rate where the products are sold to unrelated parties,
then the corporation would try to book as much profit as possible in country A
and towards this show a very low sale value of products to country B. If the tax
rate were higher in A than in B then the corporation would show a very high sale
value and concentrate almost the entire profit in the hands of the manufacturer
(country A). This is a clear example of when associated enterprises deal with each
other, their financial relations may not be directly affected by market forces but
other considerations.
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Towards such transfer pricing issues, the arm's length principle (Article 9,
OECD MC) has been evolved; it seeks to determine whether the transactions
between related taxpayers (in this case the corporation and its subsidiary S)
reflect their true tax liability by comparing them to similar transactions between
unrelated taxpayers at arm's length.
Arriving at the appropriate arm's length price is done through a plethora of
transfer pricing methods, which usually prove to be a point of contention between
the taxpayers and the revenue.
It must be noted that there are many transactions which may involve such
transfer pricing issues:44
Transfer pricing of tangible property. For example, sale and purchase of
inventory and other physical assets.
Transfer of machinery, rental of property & leasing arrangements. For
example, re-invoicing or "turnaround" companies.
Transfer pricing of intangible property rights. For example, manufacturing
/trade & marketing intangibles.
Provision of services. For example, provision of technical services with or
without transfer of an intangible right. Management assistance and
services, sharing of overhead costs.
Provision of finance. For example, interest rate, amount, guarantee or
collaterals on related party debt; short-term working capital finance
through inter-company transactions; market penetration or maintenance
payments through reduction in TP; credit terms and financing
arrangements including deferred payment arrangements or factoring of
inter-company debts.
Countries typically tend to limit their transfer pricing rules to cross-border
related transactions only; however several of them include similar domestic
transactions as well. Some examples are Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Greece,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, United Kingdom, and United States.
Furthermore, as noted above, countries typically apply transfer pricing
rules to certain related party transactions. However, some countries use a broader

definition of "associated enterprises" based on mutual benefit or influence like
4

Supra note 7, at 239-274.
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India, China and Korea. Few countries include transactions with preferential tax
regimes and tax havens under transfer pricing rules like Argentina, Brazil, Latvia
and Turkey. Many countries still do not have specific transfer pricing rules in
their domestic tax law and rely on other anti-avoidance rules, if they exist.
There are countries which have safe-harbour rules under which they grant
partial or total relief from transfer pricing obligations. For example, in Brazil the
agreed minimum percentage mark-ups based on industry norms may be used in
specific transactions.
Many countries have established procedures to grant transfer pricing rulings
under an "advance pricing arrangement" (APA). These APAs provide for certainty
for the taxpayer on the taxation of certain cross-border transactions. These
arrangements may be bilateral or multilateral. A major issue with transfer
pricing rules is that of contemporaneous documentation. Countries which adopt
the OECD Guidelines usually enforce the rules through the requirements that the
taxpayer maintain and provide such documentation to support the compliance
with them under their domestic tax law. Non-compliance with documentation
rules which are usually subject to external review (say, by accountants) may face
heavy penalties. This documentation is a major issue because of the enormous
overhead cost it creates for the multinational taxpayer.

E.

Tax avoidanceTechnique #5 - Transfer ofResidence5

Certain countries regard a transfer of residence as a form of tax avoidance.
In jurisdictions with worldwide tax regime, taxpayers when they become nonresidents are no longer liable to pay taxes on their foreign source income. Moreover,
the gains on movable property accrued during period of residence but realized at
time of departure also escape taxation. Such countries have enacted SAARs to
prevent tax avoidance through emigration. Examples are Australia, Canada,
Denmark, U.S.A., etc.
Regarding Transfer of Corporate Residence, the transfer may require
company to be wound up or deemed as liquidated in several civil law jurisdictions
(Example: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden). If a German company transfers
its head office abroad, the law will dissolve it; a foreign company cannot transfer
its registered office to Germany. Certain countries choose to impose an "exit tax" 6
when company ceases to be their resident - the company in such a case is subject to
a capital gain on its deemed sale. Examples include United States, UK, Canada and
Austria.
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Tax avoidanceTechnique #6- Branch Entities

Under a classical tax system, host country taxes the corporate profits twice
- at company level and again when company pays dividend. Most countries do
not tax remittances of after-tax branch profits to non-residents. A branch entity
therefore avoids this economic double taxation.4
Several jurisdictions regard the use of a branch as an unjustified loss of tax
revenue that would have been due to them as dividend withholding taxes from a
subsidiary. Thus, an additional tax either on branch profits or on remittances to
head office is levied.
G.

Tax avoidanceTechnique #7- Tax Havens

Tax havens are jurisdictions which tend to have nil or low taxation. Tax
havens may also be jurisdictions which have other benefits like financial secrecy,
minimum reporting requirements, ring fencing, discretionary tax privileges,
allowing ownership to be held in trust, no registry of companies and partnerships,
no taxes on dividends and interest payments to non-residents, etc.
Some examples48 of Tax havens are:
Zero-tax jurisdictions: Panama, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, etc.
Low-tax jurisdictions: Guernsey, Jersey, Bermuda, Isle of Man, etc.
Captive insurance: Bermuda, Barbados, Madeira, Labuan, Ireland, etc.
Offshore banking: Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Jersey, etc.
Collective investment schemes: Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, Switzerland,
Luxembourg, Bermuda, Guernsey, Jersey, Dublin (Ireland), etc.
International Shipping: Liberia, Panama, Malta, Isle of Man, Gibraltar, etc.
Several countries have SAARs, i.e., specific anti-avoidance legislation to
limit the deductions of tax expense or grant of tax benefits to entities located in
certainblacklisted countries.
4

46

7
4

Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note

7, at 278-290.
7, at 278-290.
7, at 278-290.
7, at 291.
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V.

INTERESTING LEGAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO
ANTI-AVOIDANCE

There are several interesting legal questions related to the interplay of
domestic laws and treaties (DTAAs).

Q1) Where do the treaties stand with respect to domestic tax avoidance
measures passed by countries?

Do the relevant domestic rules
complement tax treaties?
do they limit the application of treaties?
are they limited by tax treaties?
are they designed to circumvent limitations in treaties?
After the changes in 2003, Article 1 of the OECD Commentary concludes
that domestic law anti-abuse rules do not conflict with treaties though Portugal
has expressed strong reservation to this conclusion.
As usual, countries follow differing policies with respect to resolving the
conflict between treaties and domestic anti-avoidance provisions. The Indian
view currently is that tax treaties override domestic anti-avoidance rules. USA
and Germany try to reconcile domestic provisions with treaties but treaty
override does occur; the USA follows a "later in-time rule" for conflict resolution.
It is our view that most domestic rules & treaties can indeed be reconciled
on most issues like base companies, transfer of residence, base erosion and
character of income. However one cannot give a blanket statement because some
domestic rules may exist on thorny issues which cannot to be reconciled easily
with treaties. Good examples are:
Re-characterization of debt that exceeds the debt-equity ratio into equity
Limitation of application of thin capitalization rules to debt from nonresident taxpayers
Many experts feel that in the future, with the strong push for anti-avoidance,
we might see a lot more cases being decided where the Courts hold the double tax
treaty irrelevant.
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Let's take the Aznavour case49 for example. In this case, Charles Aznavour,
the French singer was a resident in Switzerland and performed in France through
a company established in U.K. Under French domestic law the income charged
by the company was attributable to Aznavour and taxable to him. The Counseil
d' Etat determined that the income tax treaty with U.K. was not applicable, because
under French law the UK company was not regarded as a taxpayer with respect
to the income and because the income was attributable to a resident of
Switzerland, the treaty between France and Switzerland was applied and that
Treaty did allow France to tax the income.
Q2)

Is the abuse of tax treaty addressed by domestic law principles or by the
interpretationof the tax treaty?

Countries as usual, respond differently to this question:
Belgium believes abuse of treaty cannot be addressed without a domestic
GAAR
India, Finland, New Zealand etc. believe that abuse must be treated by
interpretation of the treaty and they stress on following the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 31).
Some interesting case laws deserve mention in this regard:
a)

0
MIL Investments case - Canada"

The company, MIL Investments, was resident in Cayman Islands and it
owned more than 10% of Diamond Field Resources Ltd. (DFR), a company
resident in Canada. MIL entered into several transactions; in a tax-free
transaction it exchanged a number of DFR shares with result that its interest
decreased to less than 10% of DFR. Subsequently, MIL incorporated in
Luxembourg & became resident there. MIL then sold some of the shares it
had received in exchange for DFR shares and later it disposed of its entire
interest in DFR, realizing a significant capital gain. The key point was that
the capital gains were taxable under Canadian domestic law but if MIL
could successfully invoke the protection of Article 13 of the CanadaLuxembourg DTAA, the gain would be exempt from taxation in Canada.
Revenue Canada tried to argue that the Treaty is inapplicable. However,

4

5o

French Supreme Administrative Court, Mar 28, 2008, No 271366, 9 th & 10f Section,
Aznavour.
MIL (Investments) S.A. v. The Queen, [2006] 5 C.T.C. 2552 (Can.) (Tax Court of
Canada) (affirmed on other grounds, 2007 FCA 236).
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though the Canadian Court was receptive to GAAR, it ruled in favour of
MIL. Interestingly, Court tested the transaction against Canadian domestic
GAAR, i.e., treaty abuse was addressed by application of domestic rules.
b)

Yanko-Weiss - Israel 1'
Yanko-Weiss (Y-W), a company resident in Israel owned shares in a
subsidiary that was also resident in Israel. In 1999, Y-W moved its effective
management to Belgium and became a resident under Belgium tax law. In
the following it received a dividend from the Israeli subsidiary and claimed
reduced dividend withholding pursuant to the Belgium-Israel tax treaty.
Israeli Revenue refused saying that the no economic purpose of residence in
Belgium and emigration to Belgium should be treated as a sham. The Israeli
Court confirmed that the Treaty benefits can indeed be denied in the presence
of a sham transaction. The Israeli tax authorities took a view that domestic
anti-avoidance rules are in line with the income tax treaty and hence treaty
abuse can be addressed by application of domestic GAAR itself.

c)

"A Holding" case - Switzerland

52

In this case, "A Holding ApS" a company resident in Guernsey had
interposed a Danish holding company - "AHolding", in order to own shares
in a company resident in Switzerland. "A Holding" was a mere holding
company without any economic activity and had been organized with a
view to obtain benefits of the Denmark-Switzerland Treaty only. "AHolding"
received a dividend from its Swiss subsidiary and invoked the benefits of
Article 10 of the Denmark-Switzerland tax treaty. Swiss authorities denied
benefit of the Treaty arguing that "A Holding" had only been organized
with a view to obtaining Treaty benefits and granting such benefits would
be abuse of the tax treaty. Court referred to the principle of abuse of rights
in Denmark and denied "A Holding" benefits of the Treaty. Here again, treaty
abuse was dealt with by domestic law principles.
d)

Azadi BachaoAndolan - India I
In this case, the lower tax authorities denied DTAA benefits to certain
Mauritius resident companies investing in India. CBDT had clarified in

51
52

53

District Court decision 005663/07 Yanko-Weiss Holdings v. Holon Tax Assessment
Officer dated Dec. 30, 2007.
"A Holding" ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, (2005) 8 I.T.L.R. 536 (Swiss Federal
Court).
Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 263 ITR 706 (Supreme Court of India).
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Circular 789 that Mauritius certificate of residence is sufficient for claiming
treaty benefits. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Circular and the
India-Mauritius Tax Treaty. It said that 'treaty shopping' per se is not illegal;
specific safeguards may be in the treaty itself. The Supreme Court rejected
the submission that an act which is otherwise valid in law can be treated
as non est merely on the basis of some underlying motive supposedly
resulting some economic detriment to the national interests, as perceived
by Revenue. It also says that rule in McDowell cannot be read as laying
down every attempt at tax planning is illegitimate.
Roy Saunders' asks even more fundamental & probing questions
"Can we rely on double tax treaty provisions anymore?"
"Are the taxes of just one country being avoided or in fact is double taxation
being avoided?"
This discussion throws up many points to ponder. Treaties are "living"
documents. Their interpretation has evolved over time. Substance has gradually
become more important than form, especially as more complex tax avoidance
schemes are evolved and newer financial instruments and technological
innovations come about. It is clear that when push comes to shove, individual
governments would want to collect tax from large cross-border transactions. In
such a scenario, interplay & friction between treaty and domestic anti-avoidance
provisions is inevitable.

VI.

INDIA'S

DTC:

PROPOSED

GAAR

The Indian government is set to introduce the Direct Tax Code [hereinafter
"DTC"] in the coming year(s). The DTC " brings a number of changes to the
existing Income Tax Act, 1961; we are chiefly concerned with the provisions of
GAAR found in the DTC. According to the DTC:
The Commissioner is empowered to declare an arrangement as an
impermissible avoidance arrangement (IAA) if:

4

55

Roy Saunders, New Developments: Recent Changes Affecting InternationalTax Planning,
ITPA Zurich, June 2009.
Ministry of Finance, Direct Taxes Code, available at http://finmin.nic.in/dtcode/
index.html.
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The whole, a step or a part of the arrangement has been entered with the
objective of obtaining tax benefit, and the arrangement:
*

Creates rights and obligations not normally created in arm's length
transactions, or

*

Results in direct or indirect misuse or abuse of the provisions of the
code, or

*

Lacks commercial substance in whole or part, or

*

Is not bona fide.

Once treated as an IAA, look through is permitted by:
Disregarding whole or part of the impermissible avoidance arrangement
Treating related or accommodating or connected parties as one and the
same person
Reallocating amongst parties or re-characterizing any accrual, receipt,
expense, deduction, rebate etc. whether revenue or capital
Re-characterizing debt or equity or vice versa.
Furthermore, a transaction "lacking commercial substance" is defined to
include situations where there is:
Significant tax benefits without a significant effect upon business risk or
net cash flows
Legal substance or effect differs from legal form
It involves or includes:
*

Round trip financing

*

An accommodating or tax indifferent party

*

Any element that has the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other

*

A transaction which is conducted through one or more persons and
disguises the nature, location, source, ownership or control of funds.

The GAAR can be invoked as an alternative to or in addition to any other
basis of making an assessment. There is a presumption of purpose - the onus of
proving that the purpose of transaction is not to avoid taxes is on the assessee.
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Presumption applies even if main/overall purpose of arrangement is not to obtain
a tax benefit and only if a step/part of the arrangement is to obtain a benefit.
Clearly, these rules offer a significantly wide scope to the Revenue; here are
some points to ponder if this GAAR comes into law:
a)

Are these appealable orders? Will there be dispute resolution?

b)

Will Advance ruling (AAR) be given on such transactions?

c)

What are the penalties involved?

d)

Does this mean transfer pricing rule for all transactions (even domestic)?

e)

Thin-capitalization rules - what is the impact of currency law?

f)

No safe-harbours and/or guidance on threshold debt-equity ratios are
provided

An interesting comment was made recently that the Indian GAAR seems to
have been completely 'derived' from the recent South African GAAR. It is so
closely 'derived' that in the South African GAAR, the Commissioner is empowered
to pursue GAAR issues and the Indian GAAR seems to have the same wording
though the Commissioner in South Africa is equivalent to the highest office of the
CBDT here and is at a wholly different and higher position than the Indian
Commissioner! If anything, the South African GAAR process of public debate &
comments followed up by feedback with detailed analysis and findings before
passage into law should be followed.

VII. INDIAN ANTI-AVOIDANCE & THE VODAFONE CASE
A

Why study the Vodafone case?

The highly publicized Vodafone 6 case is pending before the Courts as this
article is being written. Hence we will merely delve into the facts of the case as
known to us. The reason this case is of importance to an anti-avoidance discussion
is that experts feel the outcome of this case may throw light on how the proposed
GAAR will be pursued/interpreted in the coming years. Will substance over
form prevail? Will piercing the corporate veil going to be common moving
56

Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2008) 175 Taxmann 399
(Bom.) (High Court of Bombay).
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forward? Do Azadi Bachao and Vodafone signal a generational shift? These are some
of the questions this case raises at a broad level. In this paper we will simply
examine the facts of the case and let the reader come to his/her own conclusions.
B.

Backgroundof Vodafone case

Vodafone acquired 66% interest of Hutchison (Hong Kong) in Hutch-Essar's
(an Indian company) shares for USD 11 billion held by its Cayman holding company
through its Dutch subsidiary. The Indian Revenue sent a "show cause" notice to
Vodafone-Essar in India why the capital gains tax of around USD 1.7 billion should
not be payable by them as underlying business and assets are based in India.
Section 201 in the I.. Act, 1961 has been amended in May 2008 retrospectively to

make the foreign buyer liable to withhold Indian tax in such cases.
C.

Overview of the Vodafone case & issues raisedby the Revenue:

.... ..

.

. . . .

Figure 5: Overview of the Vodafone case
Issues raised by the department were:

Indirect transfer of shares of Hutch-Essar (India) by Hutch International
(Hong Kong).
Allegation by Tax Department that Hutch International is liable to tax in
India
Vodafone-Essar (new Indian entity) is an agent of Hutch International, and
hence liable to tax in India as 'representative assessee'.
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Tax authorities are assessing 400 plus similar cases. (Retrospective amendment
backdated to 2002 made to tax withholding section by Budget 2008).
Vodafone has challenged the notice and the amendment in Bombay High
Court.
D.

Legalprocess overview & currentstatus

N:

I

.

M,

...

....
....
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Figure 6: Legal process overview of Vodafone case
E. Facts of the Vodafone case
Hutchison Telecommunications International invited bids from several
investors for auctioning its investments in a Cayman Island Company.
Indian Income Tax authorities sought requisite information from Vodafone
with regard to the purchase of shares, by its group company based at
Netherlands, of this Cayman Island Company owned by Hutchison, Hong
Kong.
The Cayman Island Company owned shares of a Mauritian Company which
had invested into the shares of an Indian telecom company.
Vodafone challenged this action of Indian tax authorities and sought to
obtain injunction over the said action by filing a writ petition with Bombay
High court.
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F

Legal issues being debated
Income Tax Department & Vodafone sparring on the following legal issues
Scope of Indian Income Tax Act over non-resident
Section 201 (assessee in default) retrospective amendment
"Transfer of a capital asset"
Show-cause notice issues
Territorial jurisdiction of Indian tax laws & authorities

G. Bombay High Court ruling
In the Bombay High Court, the tax authorities made a strong prima facie
case that:
*

The transaction was one of transfer of capital asset situated in India,

*

It would be too simplistic to hold that Vodafone merely acquired the shares
of an unknown Cayman Island Company, and

*

The purpose of acquiring shares in the Cayman Island Company was to
acquire controlling interest in the Indian Company and hence there seems
to be transfer of capital asset situated in India.

Furthermore, the 'effects doctrine' has been approved and relied upon by
the Supreme Court of India. Vodafone has not been able to demonstrate that the
SCN is non est in the eyes of law for absolute want of the jurisdiction of the
authorities. Also, Vodafone has failed to produce the relevant agreement/
document without which it is impossible to appreciate the true nature of the
transaction. It must also be noted that Vodafone's interests are fully safeguarded
by section 195 or 197 of the Income Tax Act. The Bombay High Court in light of all
these facts dismissed the writ petition with costs to the tax authorities.
H. Supreme Court- Special Leave Petition
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed. The Supreme
Court asked Vodafone to go back to the income tax department and file all relevant
documents so that they can decide whether they have jurisdiction or not to serve
notice on Vodafone.
The decision is thus open and pending.
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I. Conclusion
Is this the precursor to Indian Revenue's anti-avoidance approach? From
Azadi Bachao to Vodafone - is this an anti-avoidance zeitgeist? It is felt that when
push comes to shove, Indian revenue authorities are not going to let treaty or any
strict doctrines come in the way of tax collection. We are of the view that substance
should be considered over form if it is concluded that there is indeed tax avoidance
after genuine investigation of the transactions.

VIII. CONCLUSION
We have seen from our detailed tour of the world of tax avoidance and its
counter measures that tax avoidance is a complex and evolving game and to counter
this we can see that there are a plethora of techniques practiced by governments
around the world ranging from judicial doctrines, SAAR and GAAR and
administrative measures.
It seems to one that various countries are trying to constantly play catch-up
with the evolving tax avoidance techniques in a never-ending cat & mouse game.
Coming to the proposed Indian GAAR in the DTC, it is an expected, but
nevertheless significant step. The opening up of our economy, our high growth
rate, the tremendous growth of foreign interest in Indian shores, the huge crossborder transactions and flows and the growth of our "intangible" economy has
opened up a gift box for the investor but a Pandora's box as far as the Revenue is
concerned, with aggressive tax planning and structuring being the order of the
day. The Indian Revenue no doubt feels there is a huge loss to the Revenue due to
the practice of various tax avoidance techniques and a GAAR is needed to cast a
wide net in order to prevent to bring tax avoiders under their scanner.
The key issue is not so much that India is evolving a GAAR but more so the
unfortunately frightening certainty of there being uncertainty and
unpredictability for the taxpayers in the GAAR implementation by the Indian
Revenue authorities. After all, the devil is in the details when it comes to GAAR
due to its sweeping reach.
The unanswered questions on the back of everyone's mind are no doubt:
a)

Whether GAAR will be (mis)used as a catch-all mechanism by the Indian
Revenue authorities. The past and current behaviour of the Revenue
authorities will probably lead to sleepless nights for the taxpayer once the
GAAR provisions are in place!
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b)

How will the Indian Courts interpret the GAAR provisions? Historically
they have been favourable to tax payer when it comes to things like treaty
shopping (Azadi Bachao Andolan). But will there be a seismic shift?

An even more fundamental question is whether India really needs a GAAR
and why the current system of a combination of judicial rulings and SAARs will
not suffice? We hope that the Indian DTC GAAR is not a case of "calm before the
storm".
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